At the same time, our understanding of the work of art is in part intellectual; we seek in it a conceptual content, which it presents to us in the form of an idea. One purpose of critical interpretation is to expound this idea in discursive form—to give the equivalent of the content of the work of art in another, nonsensuous idiom. But criticism can never succeed in this task, for, by separating the content from the particular form, it abolishes its individuality. The content presented then ceases to be the exact content of that work of art. In losing its individuality, the content loses its aesthetic reality; it thus ceases to be a reason for attending to the particular work and that first attracted our critical attention. It cannot be this that we saw in the original work and that explained its power over us.

For this content, displayed in the discursive idiom of the critical intellect, is no more than a husk, a discarded relic of a meaning that eluded us in the act of seizing it. If the content is to be the true object of aesthetic interest, it must remain wedded to its individuality: it cannot be detached from its “sensuous embodiment” without being detached from itself. Content is, therefore, inseparable from form and form in turn inseparable from content. (It is the form that it is only by virtue of the content that it embodies.)

Hegel’s argument is the archetype of many, all aimed at showing that it is both necessary to distinguish form from content and also impossible to do so. This paradox may be resolved by rejecting either of its premises, but, as with Kant’s antinomy, neither premise seems dispensable. To suppose that content and form are inseparable is, in effect, to dismiss both ideas as illusory, since no two works of art can then share either a content or a form-the form being definitive of each work’s individuality.

In this case, no one could ever justify his interest in a work of art by reference to its meaning. The intensity of aesthetic interest becomes a puzzling, and ultimately inexplicable, feature of our mental life. If, on the other hand, we insist that content and form are separable, we shall never be able to find, through a study of content, the reason for attending to the particular work of art that intrigues us. Every work of art stands proxy for its paraphrase. An impassable gap then opens between aesthetic experience and its ground, and the claim that aesthetic experience is intrinsically valuable is thrown in doubt.

 

21. Hegel argued that .

［A］ it is our sensuous appreciation that gives peculiar individuality to the work of art

［B］ it is the content of the work of art that holds our attention

［C］ the work of art cannot be understood without a process of logical thinking

［D］ the form of the work of art is what our sensuous appreciation concentrates on

22. It can be inferred from this passage that .

［A］ the paradox that it is both necessary to distinguish form content and also impossible to do so cannot be resolved by rejecting its premises

［B］ both content and form of the work of art are illusory

［C］ the content and form of the work of art are separable

［D］ aesthetic experience is not intrinsically valuable

23. Which of the following is NOT what Hegel believed?

［A］ The content and form of the work of art cannot be separated from each other.

［B］ The content of the work of art is always the true object of aesthetic interest.

［C］ The content presented without any individuality is not the content of the work of art.

［D］ The content understood by means of a process of discursive thought is no more than a husk.

24. Premises that are related to each other seems to be dispensable because .

［A］ Kant thinks they are indispensable

［B］ either of them can resolve the paradox

［C］ the premises are separated

［D］ the premises can account for the theory

25. This passage is mainly about .

［A］ the sensuous appreciation of art

［B］ the basic conception of the aesthetic experience

［C］ how to appreciate the work of art

［D］ the relationship between form and content of the work of art

 

Text 2

Every country with a monetary system of its own has to have some kind of market in which dealers in bills, notes, and other forms of short term credit can buy and sell. The“money market” is a set of institutions or arrangements for handling what might be called wholesale transactions in money and short term credit. The need for such facilities arises in much the same way that a similar need does in connection with the distribution of any of the products of a diversified economy to their final users at the retail level. If the retailer is to provide reasonably adequate service to his customers, he must have active contacts with others who specialize in making or handling bulk quantities of whatever is his stock in trade. The money market is made up of specialized facilities of exactly this kind. It exists for the purpose of improving the ability of the retailers of financial services—commercial banks, savings institutions, investment houses, lending agencies, and even governments—to do their job. It has little if any contact with the individuals or firms who maintain accounts with these various retailers or purchase their securities or borrow from them.
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